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Barack Obama, Resort to Force, and U.S. Military Hegemony 
 
Harry van der Linden 
Butler University 
 
ABSTRACT: Just War Theorists have neglected that a lack of “just military preparedness” on 
the side of a country seriously undermines its capability to resort justly to military force.  In 
this paper, I put forth five principles of “just military preparedness” and show that since the 
new Obama administration will seek to maintain the United States’ dominant military 
position in the world, it will violate each of the principles. I conclude on this basis that we 
should anticipate that the Obama administration will add another page to the United States’ 
history of unjust military interventions.1  
 
I 
 
Since the Second World War, the political and military leadership of the United States has 
sought to maintain a position of global military dominance (hegemony) and since the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union this position has no longer been significantly 
challenged. The project of American military hegemony has gone hand in hand with a 
series of unjust wars and interventions.  The record of Just War Theory (JWT) in 
condemning these acts of aggression is at best mixed, reflecting that there are different 
versions of JWT, some of which are more pacifistic than others, and that its war-decision 
(jus ad bellum) principles are somewhat underdetermined so that there is room for 
ideological distortion. What is also at stake is that JW theorists have neglected the very 
project of U.S. military hegemony in their resort-to-force deliberations.  There are two 
complementary ways of fixing this problem. The first one is to assess American 
interventions in the context of how they contribute to U.S. military hegemony and share the 
global security costs of this project. Thus, on basis of the jus ad bellum principle of 
proportionality, a strong prima facie case can be made against U.S. military interventions as 
such.2 The second way is to assess U.S. military hegemony in terms of a new category of 
JWT, “just military preparedness,” consisting of five principles of “just military 
preparedness,” and show that the American failure to satisfy these principles undermines 
its capability of justly resorting to force.3  My aim here is to briefly assess the new Obama 
administration in terms of the five principles of just military preparedness.  I will conclude 
that since the Obama administration will bring us only to a limited degree closer to just 
military preparedness, we should anticipate a continued record of unjust American 
interventions.  On a more hopeful note, this conclusion suggests an agenda for change: 
Progressives who helped Barack Obama to get elected as president are presented with an 
opportunity to push his administration toward just military preparedness. 
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II 
 
The first principle of just military preparedness is that military preparedness must fit 
with its general purpose of protecting people from massive human rights violations.4  This 
purpose allows a nation to use its military force to protect its own people (self-defense), to 
assist other nations in protecting their own people (international law enforcement), and to 
protect other people when their own government fails to do so (humanitarian 
intervention).  The purpose requires only a fairly limited American military force, mostly 
located within its own borders, because there is no credible threat against the United States 
itself that requires much more than border protection and police work, while international 
law enforcement and humanitarian intervention are best pursued as collective tasks with 
multinational forces.  Accordingly, just military preparedness requires a huge reduction in 
the size of the U.S. military (even if we assume that the United States will significantly 
contribute to collective military actions) as well as an elimination of its weaponry aimed at 
“global power projection.” 
 
The Obama administration will clearly violate the first principle.  Notably, Barack Obama 
insists that the United States must continue to play “global cop.”  In The Audacity of Hope, 
he writes: 
So long as Russia and China retain their own large military forces and haven’t fully 
rid themselves of the instinct to throw their weight around – and so long as a 
handful of rogue states are willing to attack other sovereign nations, as Saddam 
attacked Kuwait in 1991 –there will be times when we must again play the role of 
the world’s reluctant sheriff. This will not change – nor should it.5 
What goes wrong here is that Obama assumes that some countries are inherently 
aggressive and fails to see that their conduct might be influenced by America’s military 
posture, such as its encircling of Russia with military bases and missile defense systems.  
Granted, America as “reluctant sheriff” is to be preferred to the America as eager cop with a 
“bring it on” attitude of the George W. Bush administration.  But what Obama fails to 
question is the very notion that the world is to be divided into regions under U.S. military 
command (USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, etc.).  Or, to put it otherwise, he fails to consider 
that global security might be better served by the strengthening of true regional security 
arrangements and a corresponding gradual withdrawal of the United States from its 
“empire of bases,” currently consisting of around forty major-to-medium sized military 
bases across the globe and hundreds of small military facilities in dozens of countries.6 
Instead, Obama echoes prior administrations by claiming that “we must maintain the 
strongest, best-equipped military in the world in order to defeat and deter conventional 
threats.”7  
 
Obama’s “reluctant sheriff” may appear to be a multilateralist.  Obama writes: “Once we get 
beyond matters of self-defense…, I am convinced that it will almost always be in our 
strategic interest to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally when we use force around 
the world.”8  Obama clarifies that what he means by multilateralism is not U.N. authorized 
action or token allied support, but rather “doing what George H. W. Bush and his team did 
in the first Gulf War.”  The example is telling and can be used to illustrate some of the global 
security costs of U.S. military hegemony.  The United States was by far the largest military 
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force in the multilateral Gulf War; executed the war on its own terms; kept permanent 
forces in the region and so contributed to the emergence of al-Qaeda; and made clear to the 
world that only nuclear weapons can deter its superior forces, thus contributing to nuclear 
proliferation.  It should be noted, moreover, that even though Obama may seem to follow 
JWT and international law in maintaining the right of unilateral action in self-defense, his 
notion of self-defense goes beyond the morally and legally permissible notion of reactive 
self-defense (as stated in article 51 of the U.N. Charter).  In fact, Obama follows in the 
footsteps of prior administrations in defining self-defense so broadly that the door is left 
open toward unilateral wars in pretty much any corner of the globe.  In The Audacity of 
Hope, Obama asserts: 
I would … argue that we have the right to take unilateral military action to eliminate 
an imminent threat to our security – so long as an imminent threat is to be 
understood to be a nation, group, or individual that is actively preparing to strike 
U.S. targets (or allies with which the United states has mutual defense agreements), 
and has or will have the means to do so in the immediate future.9    
This understanding of preemption as included in legitimate self-defense appears quite 
broad –active preparation to strike is not the same as being ready to strike and displaying 
the intent to do so, as a narrow conception of justified preemption would require – and 
hardly constitutes a definite and clear break with the much criticized preventive war 
doctrine of the George W. Bush administration. The scope of legitimate resort to force is 
also viewed as very wide, including “U.S. targets” and allied countries.  Here it should be 
observed that the further the global reach is of U.S. military hegemony the wider the scope 
is of what counts as “U.S. targets.” In a 2007 speech entitled “The American Moment,” 
Obama seems to broaden the scope of justified unilateralism even more by including the 
threats or attacks against U.S. “vital interests.” Obama said: “No President should ever 
hesitate to use force – unilaterally if necessary – to protect ourselves and our vital interests 
when we are attacked or imminently threatened.”10  
 
In reality, then, Obama’s “reluctant sheriff” will be prepared to go at it alone; this sheriff 
will prefer assistance by other forces but their role should be subservient.  Adherence to 
the notion of “American exceptionalism” has made it easier for prior administrations to 
resort to unilateral military action and Obama enthusiastically endorses the notion.  In 
“The American Moment” speech, he argues against the “cynics” who hold that “the 
American moment has passed” and that the 21st Century cannot be again a century in which 
“we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good.” Obama 
confesses that he “still believe[s] that America is the last, best hope of Earth,” and he goes 
on to articulate a variety of ways of how under his leadership the American moment can be 
seized anew, including a fresh beginning of America as reluctant global cop providing 
security for all.11 Remarkably, Obama recognizes that the American global cop has made 
serious errors in the past – he mentions the covert action in Iran that brought the Shah into 
power, the Vietnam War, the funding of El Salvador’s death squads, the invasion of 
Grenada, among others12 – but he offers no real remedy for why such errors would not 
happen under his administration.  
 
Worse, in the name of counterterrorism the Obama administration might even expand the 
reach of American military hegemony and so increase the risk of unjust interventions.  
5 
 
Obama uncritically embraces the “global war on terrorism” in that he looks at terrorism 
foremost through a military lens rather than through a law-enforcement or criminal lens 
and, correspondingly, inflates the size and scope of the threat.  He holds that one of the 
ways in which the “American moment” can be seized again is by American leadership in 
this war.  On his account, this requires that the U.S. military adds superiority in 
counterterrorism to its traditional conventional dominance, and this will necessitate an 
“expansion of our ground forces by adding 65,000 soldiers to the Army and 27,000 
Marines” because “the ability to put boots on the ground will be critical in eliminating the 
shadowy terrorist networks we now face.”13 Obama’s proposal to reduce American military 
presence in Iraq does not contradict his seeming willingness to expand the reach of U.S. 
military hegemony because his proposal is partly motivated by his concern that continued 
large-scale presence here would further weaken U.S. military hegemony and prevent the 
United States from shifting more troops to Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism.14  
 
The Obama administration might fare a bit better in terms of the elimination of weapon 
systems aimed at global military power projection.  Obama favors investment in weapons 
and their support systems that sustain America’s “naval dominance“ and its “global reach 
in the air,” such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the KC-X air-refueling aircrafts, but at 
least the Bush administration endeavor to weaponize space is rejected and more serious 
efforts toward the elimination of nuclear weapons might be expected.15 Obama explicitly 
endorses the proposal of George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn to 
work toward a nuclear-free world, including such steps as reducing the American and 
Russian arsenals and creating safer launching protocols for nuclear weapons. However, 
Obama shares their failure to see that U.S. military hegemony is a cause of nuclear 
proliferation and that ending this hegemony might be a necessary condition for halting this 
proliferation in its tracks and moving toward a gradual global abolition of nuclear weapons.  
Skeptics may even see their plea for the abolition of nuclear weapons as an attempt to 
prevent that the spread of nuclear weapons among some countries in the South will 
restrain U.S. military hegemony.16   
 
The second principle is that military personnel should receive training and education 
fitting to the purpose of just military preparedness and should participate fully in moral 
decisions concerning the initiation and execution of military force as well as in political life 
in general.  Satisfaction of this principle by the United States would reduce its 
interventionism and the committing of atrocities by its forces, but, again, the United States 
is far away from this goal and it is doubtful that the Obama administration will improve 
matters much. In Awakening Warrior, Timothy L. Callans, who has broad experience 
teaching at U.S. military academies, writes: “The vast majority of military students I have 
personally taught in the classroom have many malformed moral beliefs. For example, most 
justify the exorbitant degree of collateral damage. They also justify harsh and coercive 
interrogation measures…. They are more than willing to err on the side of excessive 
force….”17  This disposition, together with the fact that fighting in an environment where 
the enemy is hidden among a hostile population is as such atrocity producing, makes it not 
altogether surprising that Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian conclude in Collateral Damage 
on basis of interviews in 2006-07 with combat veterans from Iraq: “The war in Iraq is now 
primarily about murder. There is very little killing. American Marines and soldiers have 
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become socialized to atrocity.”18 In my view, they overstate their case, but such an 
overstatement might be a better impetus for change than Obama’s frequent claims along 
the lines that “our men and women are performing heroically around the world” and that 
we have “the finest military in the world.”19  Of course, there are political considerations 
that motivate Obama to make such claims, but I see in his writings and political platform no 
explicit recognition that atrocity, torture, and the like are systemic manifestations of a “war 
machine” in need of fundamental change.  At best, the Obama administration will make 
some ethical improvements in the sphere of military counterterrorism because Obama 
holds that U.S. leadership in the global war on terror demands of soldiers to acquire “a 
broader set of capabilities, as outlined in the Army and Marine Corps’s new counter-
insurgency manual.”20  
 
The third principle is that priority must be given to the nonmilitary means of realizing the 
purpose of military preparedness.  One indication that the United States violates this 
principle is that the military spending per capita is around $2000 per year, while the per 
capita contribution to the United Nations is around $2 per year.  It is widely acknowledged 
in official security circles that poverty reduction is crucial for prevention of civil wars, 
terrorism, and interstate conflict – even the National Security Statement of 2002 with its 
bellicose overtones and its preventive war doctrine makes this point forcefully.  Yet, the 
American ratio of military spending to official development aid is around 25 to 1, compared 
to 2 to 1 in Holland, Denmark, and Belgium.  Obama plans to double current “preventative” 
foreign aid, including economic development programs and nonviolent counterterrorism 
and nonproliferation measures, to 50 billion by 2012, but the Pentagon budget may rise 
under his administration as well and so we might end up with a ratio of around 15-10 to 
1.21 This is progress, but it provides no credence to Obama’s claim that under his leadership 
another way in which “America will lead again is to invest in our common humanity – to 
ensure that those who live in fear and want today can live with dignity and opportunity 
tomorrow.”22 Moreover, it assumes that the Obama administration will bucket the trend of 
prior administrations in reneging on promises to increase greatly development aid. 
 
The fourth principle is that governments must carefully balance the value of security 
promoted by military preparedness against other values they must advance, ranging from 
health to education and culture, and that resources should be allocated accordingly.  In 
light of the global security costs of US military hegemony, it is clear that current military 
spending of at least 700 billion per year (which is about 50% of global military 
expenditures) violates this principle because less military spending on global power 
projection would actually increase the security of American citizens. That the United States 
indeed fails to strike a plausible balance between security and other values is illustrated by 
the fact that a mere 30% cut in its military spending would provide health care for all its 
uninsured (at least 40 million people); or we may point to the fact that in a world 
desperately in need of alternative energy resources around 30% of federally-supported 
research in engineering is paid for by the Department of Defense.23 Here the Obama 
administration will make real improvement if we assume that even though it will at least 
sustain the current defense budget (and perhaps even increase the budget due to troop 
increases and the replacement of equipment lost in Iraq), it still will be able to fulfill its 
promises to reduce taxes for most individuals, raise the minimum wage, preserve social 
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security, cut the deficit, provide healthcare and a world class education for all, develop 
alternative energies and foreign oil independence, create an upgraded infrastructure, and 
the like – all this in times of recession or at best modest economic growth.  The assumption 
is a pipe dream, and so the question is what Obama’s real priorities are going to be: Will his 
administration continue to stimulate a war economy (as in prior administrations) or move 
toward an economy of human need?  Time will tell, but we must face the fact that deeply 
entrenched political and economic interests in the United States are behind the first 
trajectory.  
 
The fifth principle is that there should be a “right authority” for settling military 
preparedness policies, and this authority should be guided by “right intention.”  In a 
democracy, this means that the people and their representatives should subject the scope 
and purpose of military preparedness to collective control and public debate. The United 
States violates this principle because its defense budget is not transparent and the 
purchase of military hardware is heavily influenced by lobbyists from a weapons industry 
focused on profit maximization.  In a word, the fifth principle of just military preparedness 
requires the elimination of the so-called military industrial complex.  Curiously, Obama 
notes in The Audacity of Hope that in the period leading up the Vietnam War “‘the iron 
triangle’ of the Pentagon, defense contractors and congressmen with large defense 
expenditures in their districts amassed a greater power in shaping U.S. foreign policy.”  He 
adds: “U.S. policy makers increasingly viewed problems elsewhere through a military lens 
rather than a diplomatic one.”24  Obama seems to think that the impact of this “iron 
triangle” is no longer with us, or at least that its impact will disappear with his 
administration. The latter would indeed be a new beginning, but Obama’s roadmap 
towards such a new beginning consists of little more than his assurance that with his 
election such a new beginning will evolve.  
 
III 
 
The “just military preparedness” principles are intended as principles for assessing and 
modifying the U.S. military. They are also principles aimed at showing that once the 
political and military institutions and their embedded cultural practices that must enable 
the execution of just wars are flawed in terms of “just military preparedness,” there is 
bound to be reduced justice (or increased injustice) in the actual resort to force and even in 
the manner of the execution of military force.25 To illustrate, hegemonic military 
preparedness makes the jus ad bellum principle of proportionality more difficult to satisfy 
due to the global security costs of hegemonic warfare.  Furthermore, the lack of democratic 
control over military preparedness issues in the United States spills over into its resort-to-
force decisions.  Limited military force (e.g., in the form of missile strikes) is often used 
against other nations without any democratic oversight, and even in the case of full-scale 
military conflict Congress has often surrendered its responsibility as the institution that 
should declare war and placed it instead in the hands of the presidency and the Pentagon. 
The military industrial complex that pushes for the acquisition of hegemonic military 
hardware and so weakens legitimate authority in just military preparedness also weakens 
jus ad bellum legitimate authority. The reason is that the military industrial complex favors 
war as the instrument of solving political conflict because war, unlike non-military conflict 
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resolution, legitimizes the replacement of this hardware and its continuous development.  
This reason also shows how lack of just military preparedness might make it implausible to 
claim that a given resort to force decision by the United States has satisfied the last resort 
principle. Here the problem goes beyond the distorting impact of war profiteering on just 
war decision-making.  Once a country fails to invest adequate resources in war prevention 
and nonviolent conflict resolution strategies and places instead all or most of its resources 
under the rubric of military conflict preparation, any claim that a war was a last resort has 
at the outset greatly diminished credibility. Finally, with regard to the link between just 
military preparedness and jus in bello, it may be noted that hegemonic weapons are bound 
to make the execution of war more often disproportionate (power projection works best 
through massive use of force that is also massive in its impact), while soldiers who are 
trained in a culture of hegemonic warfare are more likely to fight indiscriminately.  
 
Now granted that the Obama administration will fail to meet the standards of just military 
preparedness, we must conclude that it will presumably continue the American record of 
unjust military interventions that are also morally tainted in their executions. History is open, 
at least to our limited minds, and so it is hard to tell when and how resort to force decisions 
will come into the picture. There are enough candidates for the next American misadventure, 
ranging from an expanded and continued war in Afghanistan, possibly spilling over into 
Pakistan, to acts of aggression against Iran and Venezuela.  We do know that the American 
response to (real or perceived) threats or attacks has been traditionally bellicose and clouded 
in the mythology of the good global cop.  Notwithstanding all the lofty language, Obama’s 
foreign policy proposals are mostly centrist and do not offer a real break with this history. 
There is in fact not much of a new beginning at all in foreign policy if we look beyond the low 
point of the second Bush administration. To be sure, the Obama story is inspiring and the 
wave of hope that carried Obama to the White House signifies in itself domestic progress and 
will bring more social justice, perhaps even beyond Obama’s own agenda.26  It is less clear, 
however, that this movement of hope on the whole also seeks to abolish or even significantly 
curtail U.S. military hegemony.  Still, we may derive some hope from the fact that Obama’s 
election has created a window of opportunity for progressive groups in the United States (and 
elsewhere) to push his administration toward just military preparedness.27  A similar window 
of opportunity has been created within the broader global community in that the very election 
of a black president has generated good will toward the United States, and the Obama 
administration will add to this good will by withdrawing from Iraq28 and ending such gross 
human rights abuses of the past seven years as torture, indefinite detention, and 
extraordinary rendition. It is imperative that these windows of opportunity are used to push 
back U.S. military hegemony, but this struggle should be undertaken with determination and 
the grim understanding that historical opportunities are often short-lived and easily shattered 
by new conflicts.  
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